TRANS BORDER CO OPERATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARITIME SECURITY WITHIN THE GULF OF GUINEA
Abstract
The Gulf of Guinea is the coastal region running south from Senegal in West Africa to Angola in Central Africa. The geo-strategic and maritime significance of the region are undeniable. The Gulf of Guinea is endowed with enormous mineral and marine resources such as oil, diamond, gold, and fishes, among others. In particular, it is home to huge hydrocarbon deposits. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s oil production is concentrated in the West African coast of the Gulf. It was forecast in 1999 that Western oil companies would invest between US$40 billion and US$60 billion in the region alone over the next 20 years with deep-water drilling accounting for 25 percent of offshore oil production by 2015, compared to just nine percent in 2007. Nonetheless, there is growing awareness that the vast resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea are being undermined by multi-faceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. Rather than contributing to stability and economic prosperity for countries in the region, pervasive incidence of insecurity in this resource-laden maritime domain has resulted in more than US$2 billion in annual financial losses, significantly constrained investment and economic prospects, growing crime and potentially adverse political consequences. The expansion of organised crime and terrorism in the region has also generated concern within the international community. This paper therefore is investigating trans border co operation in the enforcement of maritime security within this region. Our research design is expo facto while we relied on secondary sources of data for our data collection. Our method of data analysis is on descriptive qualitative data analysis. The study found validated our first and second hypothesis which states that the repressive measures adopted in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 were implicated in the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Although this repressive approach has led to the adoption of certain militaristic measures by the Signatories to the document, it has failed to reduce the rising spate of piracy and sea banditry in the region. This is amply demonstrated through the increased occurrence of these trans-boundary crimes since the enunciation and enforcement of those provisions. Similarly, it also tested the second hypothesis which states that the weak institutional and infrastructural capabilities of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 undermined the effective control of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. In spite of the fact that these littoral states had signed and ratified several RFMOs within the region, they were still bedevilled by weak enforcement capabilities which had undermined their quest to effectively control the incidence of IUU fishing.  The study among other recommendations suggest that the root causes of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea should be tackled rather than reacting to the symptoms of the malaise. Most security challenges confronting Africa have their origin in the progressive failure of governance and internal contradictions that serve to undermine human development. The Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 should, therefore, be repackaged in order to comprehensively address the various threats and challenges, especially piracy and sea robbery which bedevil maritime safety in the Gulf of Guinea.
TABLE OF CONTENT
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1     Background to the Study                            
1.2     Statement of the Problem                               
1.3    Research Questions                                   
1.4    Aims and Objectives of the Study                       
 1.5    Hypotheses                                      
1.6    Significance of the Study                           
1.7    Scope of the Study                                  
1.8    Definition of Terms                              
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1      The Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Rising Insecurity in the             
   Gulf of Guinea
2.2      Capabilities of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and           
  Control of Illegal Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea
2.2    Gap in the Literature                                   
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
3.1     Research Design                                
3.2     Method of Data Collection                          
3.3     Method of Data Analysis                            
CHAPTER FOUR: THE YAOUNDÉ CODE OF CONDUCT AND
           INSECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA
4.1     Piracy/Armed Robbery at Sea and Maritime Security     
4.2     Personnel Strength and Surveillance Infrastructure of the        
Signatories to the Code of Conduct and Rising Insecurity in the
Gulf of Guinea
4.3     The Repressive Focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and Rising           
     Spate of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Gulf of Guinea
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1     Summary                                     
5.2     Conclusion                                   
5.3     Recommendations                               
Bibliography                                     
Appendixes A: Appendix I: An Expanded Map of the Gulf of Guinea Region      
Appendix II: Map of Africa showing the main Hotspots of Piracy in Africa      
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1:  Comparison of Personnel Strength of the Army and Navy of           
       Five Gulf of Guinea States
Table 4.2:   Timeline of Selected Piracy and Armed Robbery Attacks in the        
       Gulf of Guinea
Table 4.3:   Actual and Attempted Attacks against Ships in Selected States      
            in the Gulf of Guinea, 2003−2014*
Table 4.4:   Estimates of Annual Value of High Seas IUU Catches                
Table 4.5:  Vessels involved in IUU fishing documented by EJF during 2011     
            and 2012
LIST OF FIGURE
Figure 4.1:   Links between Piracy/Armed Robbery at Sea and Maritime          
        Security
Figure 4.2:  Pirate Activity in the Gulf of Guinea in 2014                
Figure 4.3:  Showing Actual Attacks, Attempted Attacks and Suspicious           
     Vessels in the Gulf of Guinea
Figure 4.4:    Percentage Distribution of Attacks in the Gulf of Guinea       
         2003-2013
Figure 4.5:   Illustration of Types of IUU Fishing                        
Figure 4.6:   Illustration showing Bottom Trawling                     
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1     Background to the Study
The actual geographical definition of the Gulf of Guinea region is disputed in the literature. The Gulf of Guinea is the coastal region running south from Senegal in West Africa to Angola in Central Africa. The region has a coastline of some 5,500 kilometres, roughly the size of the Gulf of Mexico. Almost too obtuse to be a gulf, the region encompasses many countries from West and Central Africa, namely: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
The geo-strategic and maritime significance of the region are undeniable. The Gulf of Guinea is endowed with enormous mineral and marine resources such as oil, diamond, gold, and fishes, among others. In particular, it is home to huge hydrocarbon deposits. Nearly 70 percent of Africa’s oil production is concentrated in the West African coast of the Gulf. It was forecast in 1999 that Western oil companies would invest between US$40 billion and US$60 billion in the region alone over the next 20 years with deep-water drilling accounting for 25 percent of offshore oil production by 2015, compared to just nine percent in 2007 (Onuoha, 2010). By 2020, oil production in Gulf of Guinea is expected to surpass the total production of the Persian Gulf nations: 25 percent of the global production as compared to 22 percent from the Persian Gulf (Paterson, 2007 as cited in Onuoha, 2012). The major oil-producing countries in the region are Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Republic of Congo and Gabon.
Moreover, a large number of container ships destined for Europe and the United States navigate the waters of the Gulf. As a major source of oil, cocoa, metals and various other natural resources for world markets, the Gulf of Guinea is increasingly seen as a key strategic point and an incommensurable source of wealth for regional actors and Africa in general. Over the past decade, the Gulf has become one of the most important regions in the world for oil and gas production. According to Onuoha (2012:4) “the region contains 50.4 billion barrels of proven reserves and it produces 5.5 million barrels of oil per day”. The region is also a key hub of commercial maritime activities like exports of hydrocarbons and imports of manufactured goods and food items. This attests to the fact that international trade is critical to many African economies, with over 90% of African States’ imports and exports conducted by sea. Thus, the high growth potential of oil and gas, their development at sea or in coastal areas, the proximity of the European and North American markets, the ongoing tensions between the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU) member-states, the political instability in the Middle East and the growing demand for fossil fuels in emerging countries all contribute to the heightened geo-strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea region.
Nonetheless, there is growing awareness that the vast resources and potential in the Gulf of Guinea are being undermined by multi-faceted domestic, regional and international threats and vulnerabilities. Rather than contributing to stability and economic prosperity for countries in the region, pervasive incidence of insecurity in this resource-laden maritime domain has resulted in more than US$2 billion in annual financial losses, significantly constrained investment and economic prospects, growing crime and potentially adverse political consequences (Gilpin, 2007). The expansion of organised crime and terrorism in the region has also generated concern within the international community. Some of these transnational organized crimes in the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain as highlighted in Article 1 (5) of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 2013 include but not limited to the following acts when committed at sea:  money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, illegal oil bunkering, crude oil theft, human trafficking, human smuggling, maritime pollution, illegal, undeclared (unreported) and unregulated (IUU) fishing, illegal dumping of toxic waste, maritime terrorism and hostage taking and vandalisation of offshore oil infrastructure.
Particularly growing in nature, intensity and frequency of these maritime criminalities are piracy and armed robbery at sea on the one hand and IUU fishing (otherwise called pirate fishing/poaching) on the other. Although these acts are frequently manifested at sea, their origins are land-based. This is because pirates and poachers are not born at sea but on land. Recorded piracy attacks in 2012 extended from Guinea in the west to Angola in the south. Partly due to the significant decrease in piracy off the coast of Somalia as a consequence of massive deployment of international naval forces, the Gulf of Guinea region became one of the most severely affected regions in the world in 2012, with 62 documented attacks on shipping. In total, 207 sailors were taken hostage. Most attacks took place in the waters of Togo and Nigeria with the latter recording 31 attacks in 2013 alone (International Maritime Bureau Annual Report, 2013; Tull, 2014). Figures 4.2 and 4.3 as well as Table 4.2 below contain details on the trends of actual and attempted attacks against ships in the Gulf of Guinea.
In the same vein, fishery resources are vital for the Signatories of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the Gulf of Guinea for many reasons. Among others, they are necessary as sources of food (protein intake), employment and budgetary income. However, IUU fishing has remained an equally damaging form of organized maritime crime in the region. West Africa which is recognized as one of the world's richest fisheries grounds teeming with snapper, grouper, sardines, mackerel and shrimp, loses up to US$1.5 billion worth of fish each year to vessels fishing in protected zones or without proper equipment or licenses (Valdmanis & Akam, 2012). Similarly, Mugridge (2010) holds that illegal fishing by Asian and European vessels in the Gulf of Guinea costs these poverty-stricken countries an estimated US$350 million in lost annual revenue. The most obvious economic impact of IUU fishing on developing countries is the direct loss of the value of the catches that could be taken by local fishermen if the IUU fishing was not taking place.
This form of industrial poaching diminishes fish-stocks, denies the local population its stable food source and destroys the local economy. These losses include not only the loss to GNP, but revenue from landing fees, license fees and taxes payable by legal fishing operators. In addition, there are indirect impacts in terms of loss of income and employment in related industries; any loss in income will also have impacts on the consumer demands of families working in the fishing industry. The weak institutional and infrastructural status of the Signatories to the Code of Conduct has largely accounted for the perpetuation of this illicit act. Widespread corruption, lack of resources and weak institutional capacity for the counteraction of the act entail that huge foreign trawlers often venture into areas near the coast that are reserved exclusively for artisanal fishermen, allowing them to drag off tons of catch and putting at risk the livelihoods of millions of local people.
Although maritime organizations, especially the International Maritime Organization (IMO), have followed the situation in the Gulf of Guinea for years, the United Nations (UN) placed a central focus on the issue following appeals from the President of Benin, Thomas Boni Yayi, for assistance in combating transnational maritime crimes in the region. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had earlier adopted Resolutions 2018 and 2039 in October 2011 and February 2012 respectively which, among other things, encouraged states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to fashion a comprehensive strategy through the development of domestic laws and regulations, where these are not in place, criminalizing piracy and armed robbery at sea; the development of a regional framework to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea, including information-sharing and operational coordination mechanisms in the region; and the development and strengthening of domestic laws and regulations, as appropriate, to implement relevant international agreements addressing the safety and security of navigation, in accordance with international law (Phillips, 2012; Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, June 25, 2013).
Consequent upon the UNSC Resolutions 2018 and 2039, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC member-states convened the Cotonou Joint Ministerial Conference on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea held in March 2013 to draft a regional strategy. The Cotonou Conference paved way for the historic June 24 and 25, 2013 Summit in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The summit with the theme: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea brought together twenty-five countries from the Gulf of Guinea to formalize the adoption of an integrated response to a comprehensive security challenge in the region. The documents drafted during the Cotonou Conference were endorsed at the Yaoundé Summit and became known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa otherwise known as the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 2013. Other ancillary documents that were produced and adopted during the summit include the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of Central and West African States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain and a Memorandum of Understanding among the ECCAS, ECOWAS and GGC on Maritime Safety and Security in Central and West Africa (Ukeje & Ela, 2013; Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth, 2014).
The 15-page with 21 Articles Code of Conduct which entered into force upon signature by two or more signatories recognised the African Union Commission (AUC) as its depository in Article 20 (2) and (4). The Code of Conduct is borne out of the need to step up the continent’s strategic approach towards maritime safety and security. It is part of the increasing commitment of African leaders to express political will and set the leadership tone in the governance of Africa’s maritime domain. Accordingly, Article 2 (1) (a) of the Code of Conduct among other things states that the Signatories intend to co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing and other illegal activities at sea. Other relevant provisions of the Code of Conduct which are of relevance to this study are Articles 6, 7 and 8 which provide for Measures to Repress Piracy; Measures to Repress Armed Robbery Against Ships and Measures to Repress Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing respectively. The guiding principle for the co-operation of the Signatories in the repression of these vexatious maritime activities is found in Article 13 of the Code of Conduct. The Article entitled: Assistance among Signatories provides thus:
1.    A Signatory may request any other Signatory, through the Centres (i.e. the Inter-Regional Coordination Centre) or directly, to co-operate in detecting:
a)    persons who have committed, or are reasonably suspected of committing, transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing, and other illegal activities at sea;
b)    pirate ships, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those ships are engaged in piracy;
c)    other ships or aircraft, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that those ships or aircraft are engaged in transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing, or other illegal activities at sea; and
d)    ships or persons who have been subjected to piracy or armed robbery against ships.
2.    A Signatory may also request any other Signatory, through the Centres or directly, to take effective measures in response to reported transnational organized crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing or other illegal activities at sea.
3.    Co-operative arrangements such as joint exercises or other forms of co-operation, as appropriate, may be undertaken as determined by the Signatories concerned.
4.    Capacity building co-operation may include technical assistance such as educational and training programmes to share experiences and best practices.
Lending his voice to the desirability of a more effective regional effort against piracy and other illegal maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea, the Cameroonian President, Paul Biya, in an opening speech during the summit noted inter alia:
Gulf of Guinea countries are witnessing a boom, with a strong economic growth, a well-educated élite, a young population aware of the stakes. But our determination, our national and regional capacities, as well as our efforts to eradicate piracy seem inadequate to prevent or effectively stamp out the threat. Therefore, collective effort is a must, for us to avoid a situation where, once eliminated in one country or area of the Gulf of Guinea, this scourge would rear its head in another...I must underscore the need for a holistic approach to piracy. This would help us come up with innovative solutions, commensurate with the context and scale of this scourge for states of the region and for the international community (Biya, 2013: 5).

Prior to the adoption and implementation of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013, the Gulf of Guinea States had taken several initiatives towards combating piracy and other associated trans-boundary maritime criminalities within the region. The nature of maritime crime in the Gulf, which as at the second quarter of 2014, occur mainly in territorial waters of coastal states, terminals and harbours rather than in the high seas, means the coastal states have to be at the forefront of the counter-piracy operations. This is because the intervention of external actors is legally limited to international waters. In this context, trans-border co-operation with international support is the best possible response. Arising from the foregoing, therefore, the central thrust of this study is to analyze the contributions of trans-border co-operation in the enforcement of maritime security within the Gulf of Guinea region.
1.2     Statement of the Problem
The Gulf of Guinea region has become the most dangerous maritime zone in Africa. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Annual Report of 2013, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the three areas that suffer from piracy, others being the Gulf of Aden and South East Asia. The prevalence of maritime insecurity, especially piracy and armed robbery against ships, in this zone is a major regional problem that is increasingly compromising the development of its geo-strategic economic resources. The menace has threatened maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal states in the long term. Although as many as 60% of piracy and other illegal maritime activities in the region go unreported due to the shipping companies’ attempt to prevent increased insurance premiums (Bridger, 2013), between 2007 and 2011, there were an estimated 150 cases of maritime piracy to the east of the Niger Delta, mainly off the Cameroonian coast (International Crisis Group, 2012). Also, there were 45 and 64 incidents of actual and attempted attacks against ships in the Gulf of Guinea by 2010 and 2011 respectively, and by the end of 2012, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea had launched around 100 attacks (Baldauf, 2012), 73 in 2013 and 38 in the first half of 2014 (IMB Q2 Report, 2014).
In the same vein, other equally damaging forms of organized crime fuel maritime insecurity in the region. For instance, illegal fishing by Asian and European vessels in the Gulf of Guinea costs these poverty-stricken countries an estimated US$350 million in lost annual revenue (Mugridge, 2010).  In an all too similar parallel to Somalia in the 1990’s, this form of industrial poaching diminishes fish-stocks, denies the local population its stable food source and destroys the local economy.
Although trans-border co-operation and information sharing between piracy-infested states in Africa below the level of the African Union (AU) has remained exceptional and patchy, the escalation in the dynamics of the Gulf of Guinea maritime piracy and IUU fishing have become a veritable source of immense scholarly investigation. In problematizing the implication of the repressive focus of Articles 6 & 7 of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 2013 vis-à-vis the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea, the study examined the following literature: International Crisis Group (2012), Onuoha (2012), Ukeje & Ela (2013), Gottlieb (2014) and Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth (2014). In relation to the weak institutional and infrastructural capacity of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 and the effective control of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea, the study reviewed the following literature: Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth (2014), Mejia (2012), Okai (2014) and Gilpin (2007).
However, the studies especially Gottlieb (2014) and Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth (2014), largely credited the minute success recorded so far in the counter-piracy and armed robbery at sea operations within the region to the exclusively security-policy and repressive focus of the declaration. However, this strategy has precluded the adoption of structural solutions to the problem. In other words, the overwhelming prevalence of authoritarian governments in the region is implicated in the neglect of the underlying socio-economic and political causes of the problem. Moreover, the strategic approaches for the eradication of these illicit activities in the region merely promote knee-jerk responses to maritime insecurity. Consequently, they ignore the structural and economic causes of piracy and other illegal maritime activities, which arise from the subjection of largely young populations to unbridled exploitation, uneven distribution of resource wealth, corruption and social exclusionism.
In a related vein, studies on the interface between the weak institutional and infrastructural capacity of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the control of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain have remained largely erratic. For instance, Affa'a-Mindzie & Blyth (2014) attributed the worsening economic hardship and the attendant resentment among local communities to the incidence of resource mismanagement and lack of effective regulations in the region. However, the work fails to explain how such development accounts for the inability of the coastal states to control IUU fishing in the region. On the other hand, Okai (2014) in his study did not define any role for the Gulf of Guinea coastal states. He rather emphasized the need to employ the SECLOMTS model of the AFRICOM as the panacea for bridging the institutional capacity gap in the region effectively. Furthermore, Mejia (2012) locates his analysis of piracy and other illicit maritime activities like IUU within Somalia and the Gulf of Aden coastlines. The report examines the interface between piracy, security and development by looking at the connection between the concept of failed states and the management of fishery resources. Accordingly, he holds that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Somali piracy phenomenon can trace its roots to the plunder of Somalia’s fishery resources and the dumping of toxic wastes off its coast. Meanwhile, no systematic research effort has been committed to interrogating the overall implication of the weak institutional and infrastructural capacity of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the control of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
It is against this background that this study analyzes the contribution of trans-border co-operation in the enforcement of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Hence, a critical investigation of the implementation of the relevant articles of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 vis-à-vis the worsening incidence of piracy, armed robbery at sea and IUU fishing within the region has necessitated the enunciation of the following research questions:
1.3    Research Questions
1.    Are the repressive measures adopted in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 implicated in the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea?
2.    Do the weak institutional and infrastructural capabilities of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 undermine the effective control of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea?
1.4    Aims and Objectives of the Study
This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective of the study is to analyze the contributions of trans-border co-operation in the enforcement of maritime security within the Gulf of Guinea. However, the study has the following specific objectives:
1.    To establish if the repressive measures adopted in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 were implicated in the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.
2.    To determine if the weak institutional and infrastructural capabilities of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 undermined the effective control of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
 1.5    Hypotheses
This study shall be guided by the following hypotheses:
1.    The repressive measures adopted in the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of June 25, 2013 were implicated in the rising spate of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.
2.    The weak institutional and infrastructural capabilities of the Signatories to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct of 2013 undermined the effective control of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
 1.6    Significance of the Study
This study has both theoretical and practical significance to students and scholars with research interest in trans-border co-operation and management of maritime resources as well as public administrators and policy makers. At the theoretical level, the study is justified because it draws attention to the often-neglected maritime dimension of national and regional security. Secondly, it argues that the exclusively security-policy and repressive focus of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct which largely accounts for its ineffective implementation has precluded the adoption of structural solutions to the challenges of piracy and sea robbery in the region. It holds that the implementation of the Code of Conduct has failed to reduce the incidence of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Lastly, the study established that the weak institutional capacity and infrastructural deficit of the Contracting Parties to the Yaoundé Code of Conduct are implicated in the ineffective control of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.
On the other hand, the practical significance of the study lies in its ability to constitute a guide to policy-makers and administrators charged with the onerous responsibility of formulating and/or implementing policies aimed at eradicating piracy and armed robbery at sea, IUU fishing and other associated illicit maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea region. Similarly, the practical justification hinges on its capacity to re-orientate and re-awaken the consciousness of the Gulf of Guinea coastal states, the members of ECOWAS, ECCAS, GGC, AU, the international community and the general public to the fact that the ongoing piracy and IUU fishing in the region are by no means insoluble but require a holistic and painstaking approach which would include, but not limited to, arresting the structural causative factors that underpin the origination and escalation of such illegal maritime activities.
1.7    Scope of the Study
The scope of this work is centred on trans-border co-operation in the enforcement of maritime security within the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea is the coastal region running south from Senegal in West Africa to Angola in Central Africa. The region has a coastline of some 5,500 kilometres, roughly the size of the Gulf of Mexico. Almost too obtuse to be a gulf, the region encompasses many countries from West and Central Africa, namely: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
1.8    Definition of Terms
Trans Border crossing or extending across a border between two countries
Gulf of Guinea The Gulf of Guinea is the coastal region running south from Senegal in West Africa to Angola in Central Africa.
Coastal Region it is a region where interaction of the sea and land processes occurs
Code of Conduct it is an agreement on rules of behaviours for the members of that group or organisation